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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we address the challenges facing the adoption of
client puzzles as means to protect the TCP connection establish-
ment channel from state exhaustion DDoS attacks. We model the
problem of selecting the puzzle difficulties as a Stackelberg game
with the server as the leader and the clients as the followers and
obtain the equilibrium solution for the puzzle difficulty. We then
present an implementation of client puzzles inside the TCP stack
of the Linux 4.13.0 kernel. We evaluate the performance of our im-
plementation and the obtained solution against a range of attacks
through experiments on the DETER testbed. Our results show that
client puzzles are effective at boosting the tolerance of the TCP
handshake channel to state exhaustion DDoS attacks by rate limit-
ing the flood rate of malicious attackers while allocating resources
for legitimate clients. Our results illustrate the benefits that the
servers and clients amass from the deployment of TCP client puz-
zles and incentivize their adoption as means to enhance tolerance
to multi-vectored DDoS attacks
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ Denial-of-service attacks;Web pro-
tocol security; Economics of security and privacy; • Networks→
Transport protocols;
KEYWORDS
Denial of Service Attacks, Proof-of-Work, Stackelberg Games, Trans-
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1 INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the scale and complexity of Distributed Denial of
Service (DDoS) attacks have grown significantly. The introduction
of DDoS-for-hire services has substantially decreased the cost of
launching complex, multi-vectored attacks aimed at saturating the
bandwidth as well as the state of a victim server, with the possibility
of inflicting severe damages at lower costs [4, 20].
Common mitigations to large-scale DDoS attacks are focused
around cloud-based protection-as-a-service providers, such as Cloud-
Flare.When under attack, a victim’s traffic is redirected tomassively
over-provisioned servers where proprietary traffic filtering tech-
niques are applied and only traffic deemed benign is forwarded
to the victim. The relative success of such over-provisioning tech-
niques in absorbing volumetric attacks has pushed attackers to
expand their arsenal of attack vectors to span multiple layers of
the OSI network stack [2]. In fact, 39.8% of the attacks launched
through the Mirai botnet were aimed at TCP state exhaustion while
32.8% were volumetric [6]; the Mirai source code contained more
than 10 vectors in its arsenal of attacks [5].
State exhaustion and application layer attacks are particularly
challenging. Attackers can masquerade such attacks as benign traf-
fic by leveraging a large number of machines that can use their au-
thentic IP addresses [4], and can thus bypass cloud-based protection
services, capabilities, and filtering techniques [24–26, 31, 41, 42].
This is further exacerbated by the imbalance between the cost of
launching a multi-vectored DDoS attack and the cost of mitigat-
ing one. Launching an attack incurs an average cost of $66 per
attack and can cause potential damage to the victim of around $500
per minute, not including the costs paid to the protection service
provider [40]. Facing this hybrid and imbalanced attack landscape,
it is essential that we develop mitigation techniques that can defend
against the different attack vectors involved in recent DDoS attacks.
In this paper, we revisit the application of client puzzles as a
mechanism to resist state exhaustion DDoS attacks. Client puz-
zles are a promising technique that alleviates the cost imbalance
between the attacker and the defender with only software-level
modifications at the end hosts and no changes to the Internet infras-
tructure [16, 21]. At their essence, client puzzles attempt to hinder
the malicious actors’ ability to flood the server at low cost by forc-
ing all clients, both benign and malicious, to solve computational
puzzles for each request they make.
While TCP client puzzles provide a promising technique to resist
state exhaustion attacks, they have not seen their way into adoption
due to (1) the lack of guidelines on the difficulty setting, and (2)
the lack of publicly available implementations and performance
studies [16, 30, 37]. A TCP client puzzle’s difficulty determines the
computational burden placed on the server and clients – an easy
puzzle offers better usability at the cost of security while a harder
puzzle provides better security but can deter users. The lack of
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guidelines on the difficulty setting forces administrators to specu-
late whether to overload their servers or turn users away, leading
them to overlook puzzles as an effective protection mechanism.
Additionally, the few existing implementations of TCP client puz-
zles [12, 15, 37, 38] are outdated and are not publicly available,
further hindering the community’s ability to evaluate their effec-
tiveness and adopt them.
In this work, we make the following contributions to address the
shortcomings in TCP client puzzles research. First, we introduce a
theory for determining an appropriate TCP puzzle difficulty based
on the game-theoretic Stackelberg interaction between the defender
and the clients [7, 33, 34] (Sections 3 and 4). Using the theory we
established, we provide a practical method to select the TCP puzzles
difficulty based on the defender’s capabilities and the expected
computational prowess of the clients.
Then, we design, implement and evaluate an extension to TCP to
support client puzzles using our practical difficulty setting method.
We incorporate puzzles into the TCP handshake and do not interfere
with the operation of the protocol otherwise. We efficiently encode
the challenges and their solutions into the options of the TCP header
resulting in a TCP puzzles extension with low packet-size overhead.
Then, we implemente TCP puzzles as part of the Linux kernel TCP
stack (Section 5). To the best of our knowledge, we provide the first
publicly available implementation of TCP puzzles for the Linux
kernel1. Our implementation maintains the statelessness property
of client puzzles: the server relies solely on the status of its internal
queues to infer the presence of an attack and creates no state until
a puzzle is verified to be valid.
We evaluated the performance of our TCP puzzles against a range
of attacks through experiments performed using the DETER testbed
(Section 6). Our results show the effectiveness of TCP puzzles in
boosting tolerance against state exhaustion attacks. First, a server
using TCP client puzzles, configured to use the game-theory-based
difficulty setting method, tolerates both SYN and connection floods
that would bring down an unprotected server or one that relies
solely on SYN cookies [9]. Furthermore, clients willing to solve
the challenges are almost always able to receive service during
an attack. Moreover, TCP puzzles result in negligible overhead for
the server, while significantly increasing the cost of launching a
DDoS attack – the size of a botnet has to increase by a factor of
200, and IoT-based botnets become unable to launch such attacks
– thereby removing the low-cost assets in an attacker’s arsenal.
We believe that TCP client puzzles can be a strong companion to
protection-as-a-service solutions to further resist multi-vectored
DDoS attacks.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
In this section, we review the TCP three-way handshake and TCP
state exhaustion attacks. We then present client puzzles and the
limitations of the current approaches to using them for TCP state
exhaustion attacks resistance. For the remainder of this paper, we
use the terms puzzles and challenges interchangeably.
1The open sourced patch for v4.13.0 is available at https://github.com/nouredd2/linux
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Figure 1: TCP three-way handshake with (a) no protection
and (b) challenges enabled.
2.1 TCP primer and SYN flood attacks
In current TCP implementations, a client initiates a TCP connection
by sending a SYN packet to the server. Upon receiving the SYN
packet, the server saves state for this new incoming connection
request in a data structure, often referred to as the Transmission
Control Block (TCB), and then sends a SYN-ACK packet and waits
for the client to acknowledge receiving this packet. A half-open
connection is one for which the client’s ACK packet has not been re-
ceived yet; those new connection sockets are queued into a listen
queue. The number of elements in this queue is upper bounded by
an implementation parameter, called the backlog, that bounds the
server’s memory usage as to avoid having the system’s resources ex-
hausted. Once a connection has been established, the server moves
it into the accept queue. A socket is removed from the accept
queue once the server’s application accepts it for processing. On
the other hand, a half-open connection socket is removed from the
queue if it expires before it receives an acknowledgment from the
client [32]. Once the server’s listen or accept queues overflow, it
either (1) no longer accepts incoming connections or (2) drops old
connection sockets from the appropriate queue to free space for
newer connections.
TCP SYN flood attacks aim to overflow a victim server’s listen
queue by overwhelming it with half-open connection requests. The
attack forces the server to drop new incoming connections denying
new clients from receiving service [14]. The attacker’s sending rate
should be high enough to overflow the server’s queue before the
connection reset timers expire. A variant of the TCP SYN flood
attack is a TCP connection flood in which an attacker attempts to
overflow the server’s accept queue for the same purpose of denying
legitimate clients the opportunity to connect to the server. In a
connection flood, the attacker completes the three-way handshake
instead of leaving the connections half-open.
Among the server-based mitigations to SYN flood attacks, the
SYN cache and TCP SYN cookies are the most common [9, 14, 23].
The SYN cache reduces the amount of memory needed to store state
for a half-open connection by delaying the allocation of the full
TCB state until the connection is established. Servers implementing
SYN caches instead maintain a hash table for half-open connections
that contains partial state information and provides fast lookup and
insertion functions. SYN cookies, on the other hand, operate by
eliminating the source of the vulnerability in TCP implementations:
the state reserved for half-open connections in the TCB. When SYN
cookies are enabled, the server encodes a new TCP connection’s
parameters as a cookie in the packet’s initial sequence number, and
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refrains from allocating state for a new connection until the cookie
is again received from the client and validated.
The SYN cache aims to contain TCP SYN attacks by reducing the
amount of state maintained on the server for half-open connections.
Although efficient against a single attacker (or a small botnet), SYN
caches do no provide protection against larger botnets for which
the attack rate can easily exceed the space allocated for the cache.
Once the cache is full, the server will default to the same behavior it
performed when its backlog limit is reached, defeating the purpose
for which the cache is used. Although SYN cookies eliminate the
key target of the SYN flood attack (the TCP backlog), they do not
provide protection against large botnets. Attackers in control of
a large number of zombie machines with valid (non-spoofed) IP
addresses can, without added effort, overload the server’s listen
queue with valid TCP requests at a rate that surpasses the server’s
ability to accept them. By only tackling the problem on the server
end, SYN cookies do not present a mechanism to strip the malicious
actors from the ability to conduct exhaustion attacks; it is also not
clear how SYN cookies can be generalized to serve as protection
schemes for different types of state exhaustion attacks [37].
2.2 Client puzzles
Cryptographic client puzzles have been proposed to counter an
asymmetry in today’s Internet: the clients can request substantial
server resources at relatively little costs. Client puzzles alleviate
this asymmetry by forcing clients to commit compute power as
payment for the server resources that they are requesting, thus
improving state exhaustion attacks resistance.
Client puzzles have been previously proposed as a mechanism
to combat junk mail [13], website metering [18], protecting the
network IP and TCP channels [15, 21, 27, 37], protecting the TLS
connection setup [12, 30], and protecting the capabilities-granting
channel [31]. Additionally, client puzzles are at the heart of the
mining process of nowadays’ crypto-currencies [10, 28]. Upon re-
ceiving a SYN packet, the server computes a puzzle challenge and
sends it back to the client. At this time, the server does not commit
any resources to the initiating client. After receiving the challenge,
the client will employ its computational resources to solve the chal-
lenge and send the solution to the server. If the solution is correct,
the server then commits resources to the client and accepts the
connection. Otherwise, the server drops the connection. For it not
to break the three-way handshake, the server piggybacks the puzzle
onto the SYN-ACK packet. The client can then solve the puzzle and
send it along with its corresponding ACK packet.
Despite its promise, several challenges face the adoption of client
puzzles as a practical measure of defense against state exhaustion
attacks. In the following, we discuss the challenges and our methods
to address them. First, there is a shortage of implementations that
allow for the comparison and the evaluation of different types of
challenge creation and verification mechanisms. In this paper, we
implement clients puzzles in the Linux 4.13.0 kernel and provide
access to our implementation in the form of a kernel patch.
Second, an important advantage of client puzzles is the ability
to increase the difficulty of the challenges as the intensity of the
attacks increases. However, there are no concrete and theoretically-
backed recommendations for selecting the appropriate challenge
difficulties. The work in [37] attempts to alleviate this problem by
requiring clients to place bids (computing resources) on the server’s
resources. A client starts by asking for service without committing
resources. If the server refuses to provide service, the client solves
increasingly harder puzzles until the server accepts its connection
request. The server may reply to a failed attempt with an acceptable
puzzle hardness for the client to solve. This approach suffers from
two main drawbacks. First, it violates the TCP protocol by adding
one or more extra round trips to the connection establishment
phase. More importantly, this mechanism can be exploited to target
clients as it moves the puzzle initiation process from the server to
the client. An attacker would congest a client’s egress links to trick
her into believing that the server is requiring her to solve harder
puzzles. The attack will lead the client either to choose to refuse
service or to commit more resources than needed. In this work, we
believe that the process of determining the puzzle difficulty should
remain the server’s task. We, therefore, present a game-theoretic
model that can be used to determine an appropriate difficulty given
the server’s provisioning and load.
Laurie and Clayton [22] present an economic analysis to argue
against the use of proof-of-work mechanisms to combat email spam.
We agree with the authors’ conclusion that computational puzzles
do not possess “magical” properties making them practical in every
situation, and that proof-of-work must be properly analyzed before
adoption; which is what we sought to achieve in this work. We
argue that memory- and computational-resource exhaustion at-
tacks are of a different nature than spam emails. First, unlike spam,
attacker benefits from TCP state exhaustion attacks do not depend
on the involvement of a human user to click on malicious links.
Second, DDoS attacks nowadays are mostly launched from compro-
mised botnet machines and not from specialized attacker hardware.
Thus, beyond the initial compromise cost, launching an attack is
virtually free for the attacker. We believe that our theoretical and
experimental results showcase the merits of proof-of-work mecha-
nisms in tolerating SYN and connection floods. In fact, our work
complements the security analysis performed in [11, 19, 36] with
the required protocol engineering and design steps, allowing for a
rich and improved understanding of client puzzles for resilience to
state exhaustion attacks.
3 THE GAME-THEORETIC MODEL
In this section, we introduce our game-theoretic model to compute
the puzzle difficulty levels that balance the clients’ computational
load as well as the server’s ability to combat TCP state exhaustion
attacks and minimize its time to verify puzzle solutions. We first
present the threat model and assumptions that we make in our
research and then turn to discussing our game-theoretic model.
3.1 Assumptions and threat model
In this paper, we make the following assumptions.
Assumption 1. Common state exhaustion attacks, specifically
TCP connection floods as well as higher-layer attacks, require the
presence of a two-way communication channel between the at-
tacker bots and the victim server. This is evident from the nature of
the state exhaustion attacks as well as their ability to circumvent
scrubbing and filtering techniques by sending lower volumes of
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traffic [4]. This implies that during a single-vector state exhaustion
attack, the victim server is able to receive packets from and send
packets to its legitimate users as well as the attackers’ machines. In
the presence of a multi-vectored attack, we assume the presence
of volumetric attack mitigation techniques (such as cloud-based
protection-as-a-service); client puzzles will complement those tech-
niques to provide layered DDoS defenses to hybrid attacks.
Assumption 2. We assume that the attackers can control a large
number of zombie machines that form botnets to coordinate large-
scale attacks aimed to deplete a target server’s resources. However,
we assume that that attacker’s army of bots comprises commodity
machines (e.g., workstations, mobile phones, and IoT devices) but
not servers or clusters with large computing resources. Such ma-
chines, being part of enterprise solutions, are harder to compromise
than commodity machines as they would employ better protective
mechanisms. We further assume that the attackers can capture and
replay packets, but are not able to change their content. Protection
against packet integrity attacks is beyond the scope of this paper.
The above assumptions are similar to the ones made in [21]
and [37]. Moreover, client puzzles do not require the end-server
to differentiate between the malicious and benign traffics. In fact,
the low volume nature of state exhaustion attacks and the require-
ment for quick and effective protective mechanisms can impede
the accuracy of such detection mechanisms. Client puzzles, on the
other hand, can provide timely protection against state exhaustion
attacks as long as the benign clients are willing to invest computing
resources to receive service and thwart the attack.
3.2 Difficulty Selection as a Stackelberg Game
We formalize the problem of selecting the puzzle difficulty similarly
to a network pricing problem [7, 33, 34]. We model the problem as
a Stackelberg game between the service provider and the service
users. The service provider is the leader and is responsible for
setting the difficulty of the puzzles that the clients must solve to
receive service. The users are the followers who then choose their
request rates to optimize their local utility.
Our model rests on the assumption that all clients are selfish
agents seeking to optimize their local utilities; we do not specifically
posit a model for malicious bots. This assumption is rooted in the
following observations. First, before the attack starts, the server
does not have means to distinguish between benign clients and
malicious bots. Second, TCP by default treats every connection
request it receives as a benign request, and thus sends an ACK
packet back without checking whether the request is sourced from
a benign user or a compromised bot. Third, positing a specific
attacker model would require the estimation of attacker preferences
and utilities, to which the server has no means of measuring. This
could create a schism between the model and its application in
the real world. We therefore treat every request as if it is coming
from a benign client, and capture the presence of a large botnet by
obtaining the asymptotic solution for our model.
Let xi be user i’s request rate, for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,N }, where N
is the total number of users in the system. Consequently, x−i =∑N
j,i x j is the total request rate of all the other users. Our model
captures the puzzle’s difficulty using the expected number of hash
operations needed to find and verify its solution. Let pi be user i’s
puzzle, ℓ(pi ) is then the expected number of hash operations that
user i has to perform to find solution to pi , and S(x¯ = ∑i xi ) be the
expected service time for a user’s request. User i’s utility can then
be written as
ui (xi ,x−i ,pi ) = wi log(1 + xi ) − ℓ (pi )xi − S(x¯) (1)
wi is a user specific parameter that models the users valuation of
the provider’s service. In other words, wi represents the amount
of work user i is willing to pay per request. log (1 + xi ) represents
the user’s expected benefit when making decisions under risk or
uncertainty [7, 35]. The utility function can be interpreted as the
difference between the user’s expected benefit and the amount of
work she has to put to solve a puzzle per request added to the
expected service delay she incurs. Each user, being a rational and
selfish agent, will choose a request rate that optimizes her local
utility. This will lead to the users adopting the Nash Equilibrium
(henceforth referred to as equilibrium) rates x∗i for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,N }
such that
ui
(
x∗i ,x
∗
−i ,pi
) ≥ ui (xi ,x∗−i ,pi ) , ∀xi > 0,∀i (2)
The service provider’s problem is to find an appropriate puz-
zle difficulty such that (1) it can effectively reduce the impact of
state exhaustion attacks and (2) minimize the amount of work the
server does to generate and verify puzzles. Let P be the space
of all possible cryptographic puzzles and д(pi ) and d(pi ) be the
expected numbers of hash operations that the provider needs to
perform to generate and verify a solution to puzzle pi , respectively.
We model the provider’s problem as finding the set of puzzles
p∗ =
{
p∗i ∈ P, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,N }
}
such that
p∗ = arg max
p∈PN
N∑
i=1
(ℓ(pi ) − (д(pi ) + d(pi )))x∗i (3)
Equation (3) captures the provider’s goal of maximizing the amount
of work that the clients have to perform to obtain service under at-
tack while minimizing the amount of work it must perform to gener-
ate puzzles and verify solutions. This formulation, in fact, captures
the trade-off between the puzzle’s complexity and the expected
work that the provider needs to perform to generate and verify puz-
zles. The tuple
(
x∗ :=< x∗1 ,x
∗
2 , . . . ,x
∗
N >, p
∗ :=< p∗1 ,p
∗
2 , . . . ,p
∗
N >
)
represents the solution to the full Stackelberg game.
We find the solution by first fixing p and finding the client’s
equilibrium request rates x∗(p). If such a solution exists, we can
then solve for the optimal puzzles p∗ by using x∗(p) in Equation (3).
4 APPLICATION TO THE JUELS PUZZLE
SCHEME
We now show how the framework we introduced in Section 3 can
be applied to the puzzles protocol presented in [21]. We first de-
scribe the puzzles protocol from [21] and then show the solutions
we obtain using our framework. For our modeling and analysis,
we assume that the server issues puzzles with the same difficulty
for all of its clients, i.e., ℓ(pi ) = ℓ(pj ) ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,N }. This as-
sumption ensures a stateless protocol and is following the IETF TLS
puzzles draft [30] and is recommended in previous research [21].
A puzzle in this scheme is a bitstring of length l bits having
m < l bits of difficulty. Figure 2 illustrates the construction of
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Figure 2: Puzzle construction [21]
a challenge P . The puzzle issuing server starts by creating the
hash y = h (s,T , packet-level data), where s is a secret key; T is a
timestamp; packet-level data is a concatenation of the TCP Initial
Sequence Number (ISN), the source and destination IP addresses,
and ports; and h is a collision-resistant hash function. The server
challenges a client to provide k solutions to a puzzle P formed by
the first l bits of y.
Upon receiving P , the client computes, by brute force, k solutions
{s1, . . . , sk } such that for 1 ≤ i ≤ k , |si | = l and the firstm bits of
h(P | | i | | si ) match the firstm bits of P , where h is the same hash
function that the server used – | | denotes bit string concatenation.
The client then sends the solutions back to the server that in turn
verifies their validity and subsequently accepts the request.
4.1 The Solution
Since obtaining a single solution of lengthm bits is best done by
brute force, it requires a maximum of 2m and an average of 2m−1
hashing operations. Since each puzzle requires k solutions, solving
a puzzle then requires an average of k × 2m−1 hashing operations.
Therefore, for each user i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,N }, ℓ(pi ) = k × 2m−1.
To capture the expected service time for the users, called S(x¯), we
abstract the server’s operation by anM/M/1 queue with a service
rate µ. We argue that this abstraction is enough for our purpose
since the attacks we are interested in target the TCP stack and are
independent of the application that the server is running; they are
only affected by the application’s ability to remove established con-
nections from the accept queue. The service rate µ can be obtained
by running stress tests on the application provider’s infrastructure
and can capture different service optimizations such as replications
and caching. Subsequently, we express the expected service time as
S(x¯) = 1µ−x¯ , when x¯ < µ. This condition assumes that the server is
well-provisioned to handle the users’ load under regular conditions.
Therefore we rewrite Equation (1) as
ui (xi ,x−i ,pi ) = wi log(1 + xi ) − k × 2m−1xi − 1
µ − x¯ (4)
We now turn to the provider’s formulation. We represent the
space of all possible puzzles as the set of tuples (k,m) where k ∈ N
is the number of solutions requested andm ∈ N is the number of
bits of difficulty in each. Therefore we writeP = {(k,m) ,k,m ∈ N}.
As previously discussed, every challenge can be generated using
only one hash operation, therefore we write д(pi ) = 1, ∀i .
When the server receives a solution, it generates a hash from
the received packet’s header and then verifies each of the k solu-
tions until it finds a violating one or deems the puzzle correctly
solved. If the server chooses which of the k solutions to verify uni-
formly at random, it then needs an average of k2 hashing operations.
Therefore, we can write d(pi ) = 1 + k2 , ∀i .
Since we assume that the service provider issues puzzles with the
same difficulty for all users, we henceforth write p = (k,m) = pi ,∀i .
We can then rewrite Equation (3) as
p∗ = arg max
p∈P
N∑
i=1
(
k × 2m−1 − 2 − k2
)
x∗i (p) (5)
Letwav be the average client valuation of the server’s service and
α be the server’s asymptotic service rate per user, under normal
operation.
Theorem 1. The Nash equilibrium is achieved at p∗ = (k∗,m∗)
such that:
ℓ(p∗) = k∗ × 2m∗−1 = wav(α + 1) (6)
Proof. We show the proof of Theorem 1 in Appendix A. □
4.2 Analysis
The equilibrium difficulty we obtained in Theorem 1 illustrates an
important design tradeoff between the server’s provisioning and
the difficulty of the puzzles that the clients should solve when the
server is under attack. A well-provisioned server, i.e., one for which
α > 1, will be able to absorb a larger fraction of the attack and
subsequently asks its clients to solve less complex challenges. In
that case, the clients help the server tolerate the attack and commit
fewer resources than they are willing to (the average number of
hashes they would need to perform to solve a challenge is less
than wav ) — the client achieves high utility. On the contrary, a
server that is not able to handle all of its clients’ regular load, i.e.,
one for which α < 1, would require its clients to solve harder
puzzles (p∗ ≃ wav ) and thus achieve lower utility levels. Therefore,
to tolerate an attack, the server asks its clients to commit more
resources risking more clients dropping out as the intensity of the
attack increases. Those clients with wi < wav would consider it
more beneficial for them to drop out since it would be too costly as
a function of the resources committed to obtaining a connection.
We further note that our model and solution are agnostic to the
application that is run by the server as well as the specific server
configuration. This, in fact, is consistent with TCP being a transport
layer protocol that is independent of the type of application running
on top of it. All our model requires is an estimate of the server’s
capacity to handle large loads (i.e., the parameter α ) which can be
obtained by running appropriate stress tests. Server replication and
load balancing are then captured in our model through an increase
in the value of α (given the same load).
Finally, we note that our result is not affected by the presence of
long-lived TCP connections (for example, if using HTTP/1.1 [17]).
The puzzles protect the TCP connection establishment channel and
allows users to connect to the server in the presence of malicious
attacks. The lifetime of the established connection is not affected by
the presence of puzzles or lack thereof; in the case of HTTP/1.1, the
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Figure 3: Performance profiles of (a) client (wav ) and (b)
server (α ).
goal of the challenges is to allow clients to establish the TCP connec-
tion upon which the HTTP session persists. Moreover, the solution
we present in Theorem 1 captures p∗ in terms of expected number
of hash operations that a client needs to perform per attempted
connection, whilewav represents the average client valuation of the
requested service per request. For an HTTP/1.1 persistent session,
the client would only need to pay p∗ hashes once.
4.3 Obtaining model parameters
The model parameters,wav and α , relate to the performance capa-
bilities of the server and the clients. We provide an experimental
procedure to obtain the model parameters. Then we apply the pro-
cedure to an experimental setup to show the Nash strategy.
First,wav is the number of hashes we assume the client is willing
to perform to complete the TCP handshake. It represents the level
of acceptable service degradation as each TCP connection will take
longer to finish. To findwav , we assume that 400 ms is adequate
time to establish a TCP three-way handshake for a legitimate client
when the server is under attack. Usability studies show that a 400ms
delay does not interrupt the user’s flow of thoughts [29]. Using this
assumption, we find the number of hashes a machine can perform
for 400 ms by profiling the machines. wav is the average value
obtained during the experiments.
Second, α is the service parameter of the server. It is directly
related to the processing power of the server. To obtain the parame-
ter, we start by stress testing a server. The stress test varies the rate
of requests per second and records the time it takes to get service
for each rate. We compute α as the ratio of service rate over the
number of concurrent requests.
Finally, after obtainingwav and α , we calculate the equilibrium
difficulty parameters (k∗,m∗) using Equation (6). The choice of
those parameters exposes a tradeoff between the number of hashes
the server needs to verify a solution and the probability that an ad-
versary can guess a solution. Choosing a very small k will increase
the attacker’s ability to guess a solution, and selecting a large k will
increase the solution verification time. On the other hand, by se-
lecting lower values of k , the challenge difficultym would increase
allowing the server to offset its lack of computational resources
onto its clients by asking them to solve harder challenges.
4.4 Example
In the following, we present an example for computing the Nash
equilibrium difficulty for a server serving a variety of machines
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Opcode 0xfc Length k m
ℓ Preimage · · ·
· · · preimage Padding (NOP)
Figure 4: TCP Options block for a SYN challenge.
with varying processing powers. Starting with the client, we obtain
wav by profiling the number of SHA-256 operations per second.
Figure 3 (a) shows the profile of three CPU types: (1) cpu1 is an
Intel Xeon E3-1260L quad-core processor running at 2.4 Ghz, (2)
cpu2 is an Intel Xeon X3210 quad-core processor running at 2.13
Ghz, and (3) cpu3 is an Intel Xeon processor running at 3Ghz.
The average number of hashes that can be performed over the
three types of CPUs is wav = 140630. Although the CPUs we
profiled are not an exhaustive representative set of the processing
powers of a typical clientele, in all of our experiments, we leveled
the play-field by providing all the attackers with similar or better
computational powers. In other words, if a client can perform a
three-way handshake in 400 ms, a typical attacker can perform the
same connection in a time equal to or less than 400 ms.
Then we estimate the server’s α parameter. We deployed an
Apache2 web server on a dual Intel Xeon hexa-core processor run-
ning at 2.2 GHz with 24 GB of RAM. We then used the apache
benchmarking tool ab [1] to profile the performance of the server
under regular and high loads. Figure 3 (b) shows the service rate
(µ) and the service parameter α of our server as the number of
concurrent requests attempted by ab increases. Our server was
able to maintain a constant service rate under high load (µ ≃ 1100
requests/s), and thus the parameter α converged to a value of 1.1 as
the load increased. Thus for our example, withwav = 140630 and
α = 1.1, the TCP puzzle difficulty is set at the value k∗ = 2 and the
difficultym∗ = 17 bits from Equation (6). That is, each challenge
requests two solutions with 17 bits of difficulty each.
5 IMPLEMENTATION
We implemented the TCP challenges in the Linux kernel’s TCP
stack using the Linux 4.13.0 source. The puzzles are turned off by
default and are only enabled when the socket’s queue is full. We
designed our implementation in a way such that the challenges
take precedence over the SYN cookies once the queue is full; we
do however support SYN cookies as a backup option. We provided
support for dynamically tuning the parameters of the challenges
through the kernel’s sysctl interface. Both k andm can be adapted
at any point during the server’s runtime.
We generate the challenge’s pre-image by hashing a string con-
taining: (1) a server’s secret key, generated once at the start of a
socket’s lifetime, (2) the server’s current timestamp, (3) the SYN
packet’s source and destination IP addresses, and (4) the SYN packet’s
source and destination port numbers. For the hashing function, we
used the Linux kernel’s SHA256 implementation since it provides
the necessary pre-image resistance guarantees [21].
In order not to break the TCP definition, we inject the challenges
and solution into the options field of the TCP SYN-ACK and ACK
packets. Figure 4 shows the format of the TCP option we imple-
mented to transmit a challenge in the SYN-ACK packet.We chose an
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Figure 5: TCP Options block for a SYN solution with k = 2.
unused opcode (0xfc) to represent a challenge option. The Length
field indicates the length of each option block in bytes, including
the opcode and the field itself. We allocate one byte each for the
number of solutions k , the difficulty of the puzzlem (in bits), and
the pre-image and solution length l . Next, we insert the challenge’s
pre-image. Finally, following the TCP stack requirement, each op-
tion block must be 32 bits aligned, we, therefore, insert 0 to 3 NOP
fields to ensure alignment.
Figure 5 shows the format of the TCP option used by a client to
send a computed solution. Similar to the challenge option, we made
use of the unallocated opcode (0xfd). Since the server keeps no state
about the client after receiving the first SYN packet, the client safely
assumes that the server has ignored its previously announced Max-
imum Segment Size (MSS) andWindow Scaling (Wscale) parameters.
We then resend the MSS and Wscale values within the solution
block and then write down each of the k solutions and perform
alignment to 32 bits.
The benefits of adding the MSS and Wscale parameters to the so-
lution option block are twofold. First, the challenge protocol would
be self-contained; implementation of the TCP stack usually ignores
all options other than timestamps in any packet other than the SYN
and SYN-ACK packets. Therefore supporting the challenge protocol
does not require changes to legacy options parsing. The addition
also provides us with the benefit of reducing the space needed to re-
send the options in the ACK packet. For example, sending the MSS
values as a separate option would require 4 bytes while we only
need 2 in the case of the self-contained solution option. Second, we
encode the MSS value using 16 bits (as defined in the specification
of TCP), instead of the 3 bits provided by SYN cookies. Additionally,
when SYN cookies are in operation, the client and the server can
no longer agree on the window scaling parameters, which reduces
the performance of the TCP connection.
Also, modern implementations of the TCP stack support the
exchange of timestamps as options in the TCP header to improve
the estimation of the connection’s round-trip time. Our implemen-
tation makes use of the timestamps option, whenever available, to
generate, solve, and verify a challenge. However, in the case where
the timestamps option is not put to use (for example turned off by
the client or the server), our implementation embeds the timestamp
used in the generation of the challenge (an additional 4 bytes) in
both the challenge and the solution option blocks.
Furthermore, when the server’s accept queue overflows, its de-
fault behavior is to reject new connections, even if the protection
mechanism is in place. However, for our purposes, since the goal
of the puzzle protection mechanism is to throttle the rate of all
clients (both benign and malicious), we modified the listening TCP
socket’s implementation to send a challenge when the protection
is in effect, even if the accept queue overflows. When the server re-
ceives an ACK packet while under attack, it first checks if the queue
is full and only performs the verification procedure when there is
room to accept the connection. If the queue is full, the server will
ignore the ACK packet. In such a case, the user (both benign and
malicious) assumes that the connection has been established and
will begin sending application level packets thus causing the server
to reply with a reset (RST) packet to signal that the connection was
not established. This implementation choice achieves the goal of
deceiving the malicious users that they have established a connec-
tion while they have not; the malicious agents that do not send
application-level packets will not receive a RST packet to indicate
that the server has dropped the connection.
Finally, to combat replay attacks, we make use of the timestamp
in the solution to check if a challenge has expired. This stateless
mechanism hinders an attacker’s ability to replay solution packets
since tampering with the timestamp will cause the solution verifica-
tion to fail. The timeout interval can be tuned through the kernel’s
sysctl interface.
6 EVALUATION
Using our modified Linux kernel, we evaluated the performance
of the TCP puzzles in safeguarding a server TCP connection es-
tablishment channel against both SYN and connection floods. The
difficulty of the puzzles employed is the Nash solution that we
established in Section 4.
We performed the experiments using DETER [8], a cybersecurity
testbed based on Emulab provided by the University of Southern
California. DETER allows for reproducible experiments that are
described using network simulator (ns) scripts and an agent activa-
tion module. The testbed automatically deploys and executes the
scenarios.
The goals of our experiments are to evaluate (1) the effectiveness
of TCP puzzles in the protection against state exhaustion attacks,
(2) the impact of TCP puzzles on service quality, and (3) the abil-
ity of the Nash equilibrium puzzle difficulty to balance the client
solution and the server verification loads as well as the ability to
effectively rate limit malicious attackers. We perform the experi-
ments using a test deployment of a single server providing service
to a set of clients while being the target of a state exhaustion attack
launched by a botnet of malicious machines. Specifically, our server
runs an apache2 HTTP server with an application that accepts
“gettext/size" requests and returns messages containing size
bytes of random text. The clients, on the other hand, run an HTTP
client that requests text from the server at a pre-specified rate.
While in a real-world deployment, service would be provided by
a farm of servers, our scenario uses only one server and a smaller
set of clients. In those larger systems, since a load balancer forwards
TCP connection requests to the individual servers, an attack has
to ensure its wave of requests reaches all of the servers to effec-
tively deny service. Therefore, adding more servers allows a service
provider to tolerate bigger attacks by large botnets. Our results
show that, in essence, a server using TCP puzzles as means for state
exhaustion DDoS protection can tolerate a larger botnet than an
unprotected server. We hence argue that when all the servers in
a farm employ our protection, the system will be able to tolerate
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a larger botnet that is proportional to the improved tolerance of
a single server. Our experiment scenario thus studies the protec-
tion offered to a single server; the results are to scale when more
puzzles-equipped servers are deployed in a load balancing scheme.
We consider two types of attackers, the first uses randomized
source IP addresses to target the server’s listen queue with a flood
of half-open TCP connections (using hping3). The second type uses
real IP addresses to flood the server with established connections
(using nping) in an attempt to fill its accept queue and prevent new,
legitimate, connections from being established. Unless otherwise
stated, we use the following experiment parameters. The set of
clients contains 15 machines requesting 10, 000 bytes of data at
exponentially distributed time intervals, with rate rc = 20 requests
per second. The botnet consists of 10 machines running an attack
at a constant rate ra = 500 requests per second, amounting to
an overall attack rate of 5, 000 packets per second (pps). All of
the malicious machines are equipped with a computational power
equal to, or greater than, that of the clients’ machines. All of the
machines in our setup are equipped with our modified kernel, with
the exception of Experiment 5 in which we study the impact of the
puzzles when some of the machines do no deploy the patch.
Finally, with the exclusion of Experiment 6, all the experiments
use the same network topology with well-provisioned link band-
widths so as to avoid link saturation. The backbone consists of three
routers fully connected with 1 Gbps links. The server connects to
the network with a 1 Gbps link while all the other hosts connect to
the network with 100 Mbps links. All of our agents run on physical
machines with Ubuntu 16.04 LTS along with our patched Linux
4.13.0 kernel. We provide more details about the hardware specs of
the machines we used as well as the network topology (Figure 16) in
Appendix A. We deploy the packet monitoring software, tcpdump,
on all of the machines and use the captures to measure the through-
put at the server, the throughput at each host, the TCP connection
time, and the number of dropped TCP connections. We elect to re-
port on the throughput since it represents a direct assessment of the
impact of puzzles on our application, nevertheless we acknowledge
that different applications will require different metrics.
6.1 Experiment 1: Impact of puzzles on client
performance
In the first experiment we show that the puzzles’ impact on the
connection time can be controlled by setting the parameters k and
m. We study the impact of TCP puzzles by varying the number of
solution required per challenge, k , over the set {1, 2, 3, 4} and the
number of difficulty bits per solution,m, over the set {4, 10, 16, 20}.
Figure 6 shows the cumulative density function (CDF) of the
connection time of a client node as the parameters k and m are
varied. We first note that any increase in either parameter causes
the connection times to increase. However, each parameter affects
the rate of change of connection time with a different magnitude.
More to the point, increasing the number of difficulty bits increases
the connection time with an exponential factor. For example, when
k = 1, the average connection time form = 4 is 2.0 µs while it is 286
µs form = 16. On the other hand, changing the number of puzzles
increases the connection time with a constant factor, in m = 16
the average connection time for k = 1 is 286 µs while the average
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Figure 7: Throughput at a client and server during SYNflood.
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Figure 8: Throughput at a client and server during a connec-
tion flood.
connection time for k = 4 is 558 µs. By tuning both variables of
the puzzle difficulty, the defender has a fine-grained control over
the connection time for a host and thus its ability to perform state
exhaustion attacks.
6.2 Experiment 2: SYN and connection flood
protection
In the second set of experiments, we show that a server running
TCP puzzles is able to tolerate a SYN flood and a connection flood.
We also show that TCP cookies do not offer protection during a
connection flood.
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nection flood attack.
In the first scenario, we start a distributed SYN flood attack.
Without protection, the SYN flood fills the listen queue with half-
open TCP connections leading the server to drop new incoming
connections. We measure the throughput at a client and the server
for three settings: (1) no protection (control settings), (2) TCP SYN
cookies, and (3) TCP client puzzles. Figure 7 shows the throughput
measured during the experiment. The attack duration, shown by the
shaded region, is initiated at t = 120 and concludes at t = 480. The
throughput’s behavior for both the server and client are consistent;
we therefore restrict our analysis to the server’s case. For the control
setting, the server’s throughput drops to zero as soon as the attack
starts and returns to full capacity 30 seconds after the attack ends.
On the other hand, SYN cookies are effective at rendering such an
attack ineffective and ensuring a constant throughput at the server
throughput the attack. By storing partial state of the connection
in the TCP sequence number instead of in the listen queue, SYN
cookies provide protection against this type of attack. Finally, when
low difficulty puzzles are enabled, (k,m) = (1, 8), the throughput is
unaffected during the attack. Similarly to SYN cookies, the puzzles
enable to reconstruction of a connection’s state with no use of
the listen queue. However, when using the Nash equilibrium
difficulty, (k,m) = (2, 17), the throughput is reduced to 50 Mbps
during the attack. The throughput reduction is due to the Nash
equilibrium strategy being more aggressive than the easier setting;
in this scenario easy puzzles were enough to alleviate the attack as
the botnet is not completing the connection, this would not be the
case for the next scenario.
In the second scenario, we use the attacker nodes to launch a
distributed connection flood attack. We measure the same metrics
as the first scenario for three cases: no protection, SYN cookies, and
TCP puzzles at Nash difficulties. The TCP puzzles at difficulty of 8
bits were ineffective at protecting the server’s state. For readability,
we elected not to show these results in this plot since we will revisit
various difficulty settings in Section 6.3.
Figure 8 shows the throughput of a client and the server during
the experiment. Moreover, we use the sparkline in the client plot
to mark when the server sends a SYN-ACK packet with a challenge
(bright tick) or without a challenge (dark tick). The results show
that SYN cookies are ineffective during a connection flood, the
server’s throughput drops to 0 as is the case when no protection
is in place. In both those cases, the server needs 30 seconds to
detect the end of the flood and fully recover. On the other hand,
TCP puzzles at Nash difficulties provide tolerance against the flood
attack. The throughput of the client and the server is about 40%
of their respective nominal rates. It is interesting to note that the
throughput periodically spikes during the attack phase. This occurs
because not all the requests of the clients require a puzzle, as shown
by the dark ticks in the sparkline during the attack phase. The
performance improvement is due to the opportunistic nature of the
protection controller; that is, when the listen queue is not full,
a connection request is answered without a challenge allowing a
host to take advantage of the resource instantly. We also note that
easy puzzles were unable to affect the attacker bots’ connectivity
rates and thus provided no better protection than SYN cookies.
Additionally, we measured the impact of the TCP challenges
on the CPU utilization of the client, server, and attacker machines.
Figure 9 shows that the impact on the server of generating and
verifying the puzzles is negligible, the server’s CPU utilization
stayed below 5% and did not exceed its nominal (under regular load)
value. In accordance with the nature of computational puzzles, the
CPU utilization at the clients’ machines increased during the attack,
nevertheless still remaining well under 20%, with an average of 10%.
The attacker machines, on the other hand, witnessed a spike in CPU
utilization during the period of the attack, reaching a maximum of
60%. These results highlight that our equilibrium difficulty setting
achieved our desired goals of (1) putting minimal overhead on
the server to generate and verify puzzles, (2) inducing tolerable
nuisance to the clients, and (3) effectively rate limit the attackers’
established requests rate and increase their computational burden.
In fact, the sudden increase in the CPU utilization at the botnet
machines can serve as an alert to the owners of these machines to
the possible presence of malware.
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We further study the impact of the TCP cookies and puzzles on
the server’s internal listen and accept queues during a connec-
tion flood attack. Figure 10 illustrates that when SYN cookies are
the only defensive mechanism in place, both queues are fully satu-
rated which explains the zero throughput observed by the benign
clients. On the other hand, with TCP challenges in place, the accept
queue is almost always empty, which is a direct result of the puzzles
being able to rate limit every user, whether benign or malicious,
to an average of 2 requests per second. Additionally, the listen
queue, although mostly saturated, shows frequent openings that
are consistent with the opportunistic nature of our implementation
as highlighted by the sparklines in Figure 7.
Finally, we show that TCP puzzles (at Nash difficulty) throttle
the attacker’s rate of established connections. We measured the
effective completed connections rate of all attackers as seen by
the server during the connection flood. The measurements, shown
in Figure 11, reveal that the attack rate is not affected by TCP
cookies, achieving an average rate of 225 connections per second
(cps), whereas TCP puzzles severely limit the attackers’ rate at an
average of 4 cps, a reduction by a factor of 37.
6.3 Experiment 3: Nash equilibrium strategy
In this experiment, we show that the Nash equilibrium difficulty pro-
vides the optimal balance between the clients’ throughput and the
attack tolerance during an attack; the Nash equilibrium is selected
based on the capabilities of the clients and the defense requirements
of the server. We study the impact on the clients’ throughput and
the attacker’s abilities of the Nash equilibrium strategy compared
to other difficulties during a connection flood attack.
Figure 12 shows the average and standard deviation of the through-
put of a client during attack. In general, for any k, ifm < 12, the
ease of solving the challenges does not affect the attackers’ rate,
thus causing a denial of service. The Nash equilibrium strategy
results in the most stable throughput with an average of 3.90 Mbps
and low variability. Even though some of the other settings have
a higher average throughput, the throughput is highly unstable
reaching zero at many times. Additionally, we note that when the
difficulty is set to (k = 2,m = 16), the throughput achieves a slightly
better average with comparable variability. However, the Nash dif-
ficulty setting provides the rate that balances the acceptable cost
a client is willing to pay (in terms of increased connection time
and thus decreased throughput), and the server’s ability to tolerate
state exhaustion attacks by throttling the attackers’ rates. In fact, at
the Nash difficulty, the puzzles mechanism reduced the attackers’
average SYN sending rate from 2250 pps for (k = 2,m = 16) to 1668
pps, and the average connection establishment rate from 30 cps to
22 cps.
6.4 Experiment 4: Botnet effectiveness
In the fourth experiment, we show that TCP puzzles increase the
server’s tolerance to a botnet and require attackers to increase their
botnet’s size to deny service. We vary the botnet’s size and attack
rate and measure the cumulative attack rate as seen by the botnet
(referred to as the measured attacker rate) and the server (referred
to as the connection completion rate). The connection completion
rate is the effective attack rate that actually impacts the server. In
the first scenario, we set the number of nodes in the botnet to 5
and vary the sending rate of each node between 100 and 1000 pps.
Figure 13(a) shows the measured attack rate and Figure 13(b) shows
the rate of completed connections. The results show that the TCP
puzzles are capable of rate limiting the effective attack rate. As the
per node attack rate increases, the cumulative attack rate increases
reaching a peak of 1200 pps. However, the effective attack rate is
limited to 11 cps regardless of the individual attack rate.
In the second scenario, we vary the number of machines in
the botnet while setting the cumulative attack rate to 5, 000 pps;
each machine’s rate is set at 5, 000/(size of botnet). Figures 14(a)
and 14(b) show the measured attack rate and the effective attack
rate as the number of machines are varied, respectively. The results
show that attackers have to increase the size of their botnets to
increase their effective attack rates. As more machines are added,
the measured attack rate increases to peak at 2250 pps. The effective
attack rate, although it linearly increases with the increase in the
number of attack machines, it only peaks at 25 cps — one hundredth
the measured attack rate. As opposed to the near-constant rate in
the first scenario, the effective attack rate increased in this scenario
since more machines have been enlisted in the botnet. However, this
increase does not reflect the increase in resources being committed
to the botnet. At the current rate of increase, a botnet has to commit
500 machines to reach an effective attack rate of 5000 cps.
In conclusion, for the attacker to increase the effective attack rate,
it cannot increase the individual rates, it has to increase the number
of machines in the botnet; TCP puzzles at the Nash equilibrium
difficulty significantly increases the cost of a state exhaustion attack.
6.5 Experiment 5: Adoption of TCP puzzles
In this experiment, we show that a client solving the TCP puzzles is
almost always able to connect to the server regardless of whether
the attacker elects to solve or ignore the puzzles or select a com-
bination thereof. On the other hand, a client that does not solve
puzzles gets erratic service when the attacker is solving the puzzles
and almost no service when the attacker floods the server without
solving any puzzles. In this experiment, we use machines that have
not been patched to support TCP puzzles; we test all four scenarios
when (1) both the attacker and client do not solve puzzles (NA,NC),
(2) the attacker solves puzzles while the clients do not solve puz-
zles (SA,NC), (3) the clients solve puzzles with the attacker solving
the puzzles, and (4) the clients solve puzzles with the attacker not
solving the puzzles. We group scenarios (3) and (4) together and
label them as (*A, SC). Figure 15 shows the percentage of completed
connections for all the proposed scenarios. We observe that a client
solving puzzles is not denied service regardless of the attacker’s
type; this happens because the attacker, being rate limited when
solving puzzles and having its requests ignored when not solving
challenge request, is not able to fill the accept queue of the server.
On the contrary, a non-solving client faced with a solving attacker
experiences a highly variable percentage of completed connections,
reaching 0 at some instances. This happens due to the opportunistic
nature of the TCP puzzles controller (as observed in Experiment 2);
the rate limiting impact on the attacker machines can empty slots
in the server’s queues thus providing openings for the non-solving
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Figure 12: Box plot of the client throughput for different puzzle difficulties.
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Figure 13: Impact of the puzzles on the attack as the flooding
rate is increased.
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Figure 14: Impact of the puzzles on the attack as the number
of participating machines is increased.
client to establish connections. However, when faced with an at-
tacker that does not solve the challenges, the non-solving clients are
denied service. This happens because the attacker’s vast resources
beat the clients’ requests for the resources freed by the TCP puz-
zles controller. We note that the service promises provided by our
puzzles implementation to non-compliant clients are similar, and
sometimes better, than those provided by network capabilities [41],
while we almost always provide service for those who comply.
6.6 Experiment 6: Impact on IoT devices
In the last experiment, we explore the impact of the client puzzles
on the capabilities of IoT devices. We show that the flooding impact
of IoT devices can be greatly reduced by virtue of the support for
TCP client puzzles. Table 1 shows the average hashing rate and the
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Figure 15: Percentage of established connections when TCP
puzzles adoption is not complete – (*A, SC) captures both
(NA, SC) and (SA, SC).
Table 1: Performance profile of embedded devices.
Device Average hashing rate Hashes performed in 400 ms
D1 49,617 19,901
D2 68,960 26,563
D3 70,009 27,987
D4 74,201 29,732
number of hashes performed in the 400ms interval, of four Rasp-
berry Pi devices: D1 equipped with a 700MHz ARM 11 processor,
D2 equipped with a 1GHz ARM 11 processor, D3 equipped with a
quad-core 1.2 GHz ARM Cortex-A53 processor, and D4 equipped
with a quad Core 1.2GHz Broadcom BCM2837 processor. The per-
formance profiles show that, while the computational capabilities
of these processors still enable them the opportunity to connect to
a server that is deploying client puzzles, they greatly hinder their
ability to effectively participate in a distributed TCP connection
flood attack. Such devices might still be able to send SYN request
packets, however, their ability to launch a flood of connections
is limited. This subsequently implies that an attacker recruiting
IoT devices as part of her bot army needs to employ much more
resources to launch an effective attack. This achieves our goal of
increasing the cost of conducting state exhaustion attacks.
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7 LIMITATIONS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss the challenges facing the adoption of
TCP client puzzles and provide an analysis of their limitations.
Software adoption As showcased by our experiments, there is a
great benefit for servers to adopt client puzzles as a mechanism for
tolerance of state exhaustion attacks. By rate limiting users and pro-
tecting the server’s internal queues, client puzzles present service
providers with a chance to provide continuous service during state
exhaustion attacks. Our implementation presents the following
incentives for ease of adoption. First, a running server can easily
support client puzzles by simply patching its kernel. Second, our
implementation does not introduce any changes to the normal op-
eration of the server and only sends challenges when the queues
overflow, the TCP stack remains intact otherwise. Finally, our patch
is compatible with earlier versions of the Linux kernel as long as it
has support for the cryptographic operations.
While servers are incentivized to adopt TCP puzzles by the in-
creased tolerance of attacks, clients, on the other hand, benefit from
the promise of service even during attacks. As shown in experiment
5, users that enable support for client puzzles are always able to con-
nect to the server. The server can protect its queues from attackers
that do not solve challenges while rate-limiting those that do, thus
freeing up resources for the legitimate clients. For the users that
choose not to adopt the challenges, they still receive full service
under regular load. However, when under attack, those users will
be in contention with the non-solving attackers for the spots that
free up in the queues by the server’s opportunistic challenges con-
troller. This scenario is no worse than the case when no challenges
are applied. Note that our theoretical formulation asserts the same
outcome, a user that does not adopt TCP challenges is similar to
one that values the server’s services atw = 0. Such a user prohibits
the server from providing it with protections since it cannot assign
an appropriate puzzle difficulty. We believe that the opportunistic
challenges controller offers non-cooperating users service promises
similar to those provided by network capabilities [41], in which
a small portion of the channel is shared between non-compatible
users and attackers. Finally, we note that users can manually elect
to disable the use of puzzles through the kernel’s sysctl interface.
Solution floodsWhen implementing client puzzles as a scheme for
resisting state exhaustion attacks, the server must commit computa-
tional resources to generate and verify puzzles for every incoming
connection request. An attacker thus might attempt to overwhelm
the server with verification tasks by sending a barrage of bogus so-
lutions for which the server must perform cryptographic operations
to verify their validity. We, however, argue that (1) the overhead
of generating and verifying puzzles is negligible and (2) such an
attack requires the attacker to commit vast resources that render it
infeasible at low costs (thus alleviating the cost imbalance between
the attacker and the defender).
Our game-theoretic formulation takes into consideration the
server’s computational load and the number of cryptographic oper-
ations that it must performwhen verifying a puzzle solution; it aims
to maximize the clients’ load while minimizing the server’s load.
This is confirmed by the results discussed in Section 6.2 and show-
cased in Figure 9. The computational effort employed by the server
to generate and verify puzzles is negligible, with CPU utilization
remaining below 5% throughout the entirety of the attack.
Additionally, the server needs only to perform one hashing oper-
ation to generate a challenge, and an average of (1+ k2 ) hashing oper-
ations when verifying a solution. We argue that a well-provisioned
server can handle such a load while still being able to handle ser-
vicing the legitimate clients. For example, the server used in our
experiments can perform 10.8 million hash operations per second.
Thus an attacker aiming to overwhelm such a server would need to
send at least 5,400,000 packets per second, each of which contains
at least 60 bytes for IP and TCP headers. Therefore, attacking a
web service that employs server replication and load balancing
requires the attacker to employ additional resources coming at a
much higher cost. We acknowledge that no solution can completely
eliminate the possibility of a successful attack. However, we believe
that our results show the client puzzles can significantly increase
the cost of launching such attacks, thus restoring some balance to
the uneven attack-defense play-field. We also note that, to mitigate
such attacks, a server that employs client puzzles can benefit from
deploying one or more proxy servers that solely handle the gener-
ation and validation of puzzles, and then delegate the application
processing of established connections to backend servers [39].
Replay attacks Since the server does not retain state about an
incoming connection before receiving a valid challenge solution,
an attacker might capture legitimate clients’ solutions and replay
them to overflow the server’s accept queue. We note however that
for a replayed solution to be validated, the attacker must retain the
packet’s parameters (IP addresses, port numbers, and timestamps).
Therefore a replayed solution can only be used to occupy one slot
in the server’s queue at a time. Additionally, our implementation
ensures that puzzles expire after a set timeout interval. The time-
out interval limits an attacker’s ability to carry on a replay flood
effectively, and thus our implementation is resistant to such attacks.
Fairness and power considerations Our model and implementa-
tion of TCP client puzzles use the same difficulty level for all of
the users, regardless of whether they are legitimate clients or mali-
cious attackers. We were motivated by two important factors when
making this design choice: (1) the requirement to remain stateless
until a solution is verified and (2) the difficulty of filtering malicious
IP addresses when under attack. This nevertheless raises fairness
concerns since the puzzles mechanism is nondiscriminatory and
treats every request as a potential malicious request. We note how-
ever, that this behavior is only experienced when a victim server
is under attack and not during regular operation. Additionally, we
believe that our work on client puzzles, as posited in [16], can be a
catalyst for future exploration of fairness schemes, such as Puzzle
Fair Queuing. We plan to address this issue in our future work.
Furthermore, we do not currently address the important chal-
lenge arising from the presence of a non-uniform mix between
power-limited (e.g., mobile phones, IoT devices) and power-endowed
(e.g., GPU-enabled desktops) benign devices. Althoughwav in our
model attempts to capture the power-mix of clients at design time,
it does not keep track of clients joining and leaving the system. In
fact, this non-uniformity of CPU power is one of the main chal-
lenges facing Bitcoin mining, with mining pools controlling 27% of
the market hashing power. A possible solution would be to switch
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to memory-based proof-of-work schemes [3] that promise more
uniform solution requirements. Another possibility would be to
adapt the difficulty of the sent puzzles based on the behavior of the
observed traffic at the server, thus forming a closed control loop.
We plan to investigate such methods in our future work.
8 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a theoretical formulation and imple-
mentation of client puzzles as means for providing tolerance to
state exhaustion attacks. We addressed the challenge of selecting
puzzle difficulties by modeling the problem as a Stackelberg game
where the server is the leader and the clients are the followers. We
obtained the equilibrium solution that illustrates a tradeoff between
the clients’ valuation of the requested services and the server’s ser-
vice capacity. We then tackled the lack of puzzle implementations
by providing a Linux kernel patch and evaluating its performance
on the DETER testbed. Our results show that client puzzles are an
effective mechanism that can be added to our arsenal of defenses to
increase the resilience to multi-vectored DDoS attacks and restore
the balance to the attack-defense play field.
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A PROOF OF THEOREM 1
In order to analytically solve for the equilibrium solution of the
game, we follow an approach similar to that in [7]. We start by
noting that the Nash Equilibrium solution of the users’ game is not
affected if we add the quantity∑
j,i
(
w j log(1 + x j ) − k × 2m−1x j
)
to each users’ utility function. Therefore we can now build a strate-
gically equivalent game where each user’s utility function is
H (x1, . . . ,xN ,p) =
N∑
i=1
wi log(1 + xi ) − k × 2m−1x¯ − 1
µ − x¯ (7)
Now looking at the Hessian matrix of H we get
Hii =
∂2H
∂x2i
= − wi(1 + xi )2 −
2
(µ − x¯)2 < 0, ∀i
Hi j =
∂2H
∂xix j
= − 2(µ − x¯)3 < 0, ∀i, j, i , j
Therefore H is negative-definite and thus H is strictly concave for
0 ≤ x¯ < µ. Additionally, sinceH → −∞ as x¯ → µ, we can conclude
the that optimization problem
max
xi ≥0:∀i, x¯<µ
H (x1,x2, . . . ,xN ,p)
admits a unique solution x∗ =
{
x∗1 , . . . ,x
∗
N
}
in the interval 0 ≤ x¯ <
µ which corresponds to the Nash Equilibrium strategies to the users’
game as defined in Equation (4). We obtain the solution strategies
by solving the first order condition of H where for i ∈ {1, . . . ,N }
∂H
∂xi
(
x∗1 , . . . ,x
∗
N ,p
)
= 0
which translates to
wi
1 + x∗i
− k × 2m−1 − 1
µ − x¯∗ = 0, ∀i (8)
Let yi = 1+xi , y¯ =
∑N
i=1 yi = N + x¯ , and w¯ =
∑N
i=1w j , from which
we obtain
wi
yi
=
w j
yj
, ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,N }
or equivalently
yi =
wi
w j
yj , ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,N }
We can then rewrite y¯ as
y¯ =
N∑
i=1
yi =
N∑
i=1
wi
w j
yj =
w¯
w j
yj
and thus we can express (8) in terms of y¯ as
L˜(y¯) = w¯
y¯
− k × 2m−1 − 1(µ + N − y¯)2 = 0 (9)
We can thus turn our attention to solving Equation (9) for N ≤ y¯ <
µ + N . Since ∂L˜∂y¯ = − w¯y¯2 − 2(µ+N−y¯)2 < 0, L˜ is strictly decreasing.
Additionally, L˜(y¯) → −∞ as y¯ → µ +N . We therefore need L˜(N ) to
be non-negative so that L˜(y¯) would admit a solution in the interval
N ≤ y¯ < µ + N , which translates to
L˜(N ) = w¯
N
− k × 2m−1 − 1
µ2
> 0
or equivalently
k × 2m−1 < w¯
N
− 1
µ2
:= rˆ (10)
We can see rˆ as the maximum possible difficulty that the service
provider can select while guaranteeing that a solution for the clients’
game exists. We also notice that if the provider had infinite resource,
i.e., µ → ∞, rˆ → w¯N which suggests that a client should not
be charged a price higher than the average user valuation of the
provider’s services.
Furthermore, it is beneficial for the service provider to ensure
that all clients participate in the game, i.e., that xi > 0 for all
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,N }. This therefore translates to the conditions on y¯
y¯ >
w¯
wi
∀i (11)
Now let y¯(k,m) be a solution to Equation (9) that satisfies condi-
tion (11) and where (k,m) satisfy condition (10), and let x¯(k,m) be
the corresponding value of x¯ . We turn to the provider’s problem of
finding the optimal pricing p∗ = (k∗,m∗) that maximizes
I (p) :=
(
k × 2m−1 − 2 − k2
)
x¯(k,m) (12)
In order to obtain an analytical solution to the optimization prob-
lem in Equation (12) we make use of the following approximation.
We solve for the pricing p˜(k˜,m˜) that maximizes
I˜ (p) :=
(
k × 2m−1
)
x¯(k,m) (13)
Lemma 1. |I (p∗) − I˜ (p˜)| < c for some constant c > 0, where p∗
and p˜ are the solutions that maximize I and I˜ , respectively.
Proof. Let p∗ = (k∗,m∗) and p˜ = (k˜,m˜) be the prices that
maximize I (p) and I˜ (p), respectively. We therefore have that
k˜ × 2m˜−1x¯(k˜,m˜) ≥ k × 2m−1x¯(k,m), ∀k,m
Let p′ = (k ′,m′) be a price with minimum 0 < k ′ ≤ k˜ such that
k ′ × 2m′−1 = k˜ × 2m˜−1 and I (k ′,m′) ≥ I (k˜,m˜). We can therefore
write
I (p′) ≥ I (k,m) − (k
′
2 + 2)x¯(k
′,m′), ∀k,m
and since I (p∗) ≥ I (p) ∀p we can therefore conclude that
|I (p∗) − I (p′)| ≤ (k
′
2 + 2)x¯(k
′,m′) <
(
(k
′
2 + 2)µ
)
:= c
and since x¯ only depends on k × 2m−1 and not on the individual
values of k andm, p′ also maximizes Equation (13) and thus solving
for p′ brings us within a constant c of p∗, the maximum of I . □
We can now proceed with finding a solution for Equation (13)
following the approach presented in [7]. By using the one-to-one
correspondance between k × 2m−1 and y¯ (and thus x¯ ) presented in
Equation (9), we can substitute y¯ in (13) and then compute p∗ using
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the solution to the obtained equation. We then write the equivalent
problem as finding y¯∗ such that
y¯∗ = arg max
N <y¯<N+µ
(
w¯
y¯
− 1(µ + N − y¯)2
)
(y¯ − N ) (14)
We defineG(y¯) :=
(
w¯
y¯ − 1(µ+N−y¯)2
)
(y¯ −N ). It is easy to see that
∂2G
∂y¯2 < 0 and thusG(y¯) is strictly concave. Additionally,G(N+µ) →
−∞, we can thus conclude that G(y¯) admits a unique maximum
in the open interval (N ,N + µ). We can then solve the first order
condition
∂G(y¯)
∂y¯
:= w¯N
y¯2
− µ + y¯ − N(µ + N − y¯)3 = 0 (15)
Obtaining a closed form solution for y¯∗ is not possible for finite
N . Therefore we solve Equation (15) asymptotically (i.e., asN →∞)
as proposed in [7]. For that, we make the following assumptions.
(1) We assume that the average user preferencewav (N ) = w¯N has a
well defined limitwav asN →∞. (2)We assume that as the number
of users grows larger, the service provider can always service a
fraction of its users, even if that fraction is small. In other words,
we assume that lim
N→∞
µ
N = α for some α > 0. For convenience,
we rewrite Equation (15) in terms of xav (N ) = x¯N andwav (N ) as
N →∞ as
wav
(1 + xav (N ))2 =
α + xav (N )
(α − xav (N ))3N 2 (16)
Equation (16) possesses a solution for xav (N ) iff,
lim
N→∞ (α − xav (N ))
3 N 2 = γ
for some γ > 0. We thus substitute back in Equation (9) and obtain
the solution
k∗ × 2m∗−1 ∼ wav
α + 1 +
2α − 1
γ
2
3 N
2
3
(17)
where f ∼ д denotes the fact that lim
N→∞
f
д = 1.
Since we are considering the asymptotic solution, we restrict
our attention to the first order term of the solution in Equation (17)
and thus obtain our desired form
k∗ × 2m∗−1 = wav
α + 1 (18)
In fact, as shown in [7], Equation (18) corresponds to the solution
of the same problem when ignoring the service delay at the server.
Since SYN and connection flood attacks target the TCP protocol and
not the application layer service, it is convenient for the purposes
of this paper to only consider the first order term of Equation (17),
thus completing the proof. ■
A EXPERIMENT TOPOLOGY AND MACHINES
Figure 16 shows the topology of our experiment setup. All the
hosts are physical machines. The following is a list of the hardware
specifications of the machines used in the setup. The nomenclature
pcxxx and bpcxxx refers to the specific hardware models provided
by the DETER testbed. Our client and attacker machines use a
combination of those models while our server is deployed on a
more capable HP server having dual Intel Xeon hex-core processors
Figure 16: Scenario Topology
running at 2.2 Ghz, 24 GB of RAM, 1 TB of storage, and a 10-Gigabit
network interface.
pc3000 and bpc3000 have the following features:
• Dell PowerEdge 1850 Chassis.
• Dual 3Ghz Intel Xeon processors.
• 2 GB of RAM
• One 36Gb 15k RPM SCSI drive.
• 4 Intel Gigabit experimental network ports.
• 1 Intel Gigabit experimental network port.
The pc2133 and bpc2133 machines have the following features:
• Dell PowerEdge 860 Chasis
• One Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU X3210 quad core processor run-
ning at 2.13 Ghz
• 4GB of RAM
• One 250Gb SATA Disk Drive
• One Dual port PCI-X Intel Gigabit Ethernet card for the
control network.
• One Quad port PCIe Intel Gigabit Ethernet card for experi-
mental network.
High Density SuperMicro MicroCloud Chassis that fits 8 nodes
in 3u of rack space have the following features:
• One Intel(R) Xeon(R) E3-1260L quad-core processor run-
ning at 2.4 Ghz Intel VT-x and VT-d support
• 16GB of RAM
• One 250Gb SATA Western Digital RE4 Disk Drive
• 5 experimental interfaces
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• One Dual port PCIe Intel Gigabit Ethernet card for the
control network and an experimental port
• One Quad port PCIe Intel Gigabit Ethernet card for experi-
mental network
HP Proliant DL360 G8 Server have the following features:
• Dual Intel(R) Xeon(R) hexa-core processors running at 2.2
Ghz with 15MB cache Intel VT-x support
• 24GB of RAM
• One 1Tb SATA HP Proliant Disk Drive 7.2k rpm G8 (boot
priority)
• One 240Gb SATA HP Proliant Solid State Drive G8
• Two experimental interfaces:
• One Dual port PCIe Intel Ten Gigabit Ethernet card for
experimental ports
• One Quad port PCIe Intel Gigabit Ethernet card, presently
with one port wired to the control network
The bpc2800 machines have the following features:
• Sun Microsystems Sun Fire V60 Chassis
• One Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU dual core processor running at
2.8 GHz
• 2 GB of RAM
• One 36 GB SCSI Disk Drive
• Two Dual port PCI-X Intel Gigabit Ethernet cards, 1 port
for control network and 3 ports for experimental network
• One Single port PCI-X Intel Gigabit Ethernet card for ex-
perimental network
Finally, for our IoT experiment, we used four Raspbery Pi boards
ranging over the released model revisions. Specifically we used (1)
a Raspberry Pi Model B, revision 2.0, (2) a Raspberry Pi Zero, (3) a
Raspbery Pi 2 Model B v 1.1, and (4) a Raspberry Pi 3 Model B v 1.2.
We deployed the Linux kernel 4.9.65 on all four boards and used
the kernel’s cryptographic API to profile their performance.
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